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Abstract—In 2019, the IEEE launched the P7000 standards
projects intended to address ethical issues in the design of
autonomous and intelligent systems. This move came amidst
a growing public concern over the unintended consequences of
artificial intelligence (AI), compounded by the lack of an anticipa-
tory process for attending to ethical impact within professional
practice. However, the difficulty in moving from principles to
practice presents a significant challenge to the implementation of
ethical guidelines. Herein, we describe two complementary frame-
works for integrating ethical analysis into engineering practice
to help address this challenge. We then provide the outcomes
of an ethical analysis informed by these frameworks, conducted
within the specific context of Internet-delivered therapy in dig-
ital mental health. We hope both the frameworks and analysis
can provide tools and insights, not only for the context of digital
healthcare but also for data-enabled and intelligent technology
development more broadly.
Index Terms—Digital health, ethics, value-sensitive design
(VSD).
I. INTRODUCTION
IN THE last year, the Association for ComputingMachinery (ACM) released new ethical standards for pro-
fessional conduct [1] and the IEEE released guidelines for
the ethical design of autonomous and intelligent systems [2]
demonstrating a shift among professional technology organiza-
tions toward prioritizing ethical impact. In parallel, thousands
of technology professionals and social scientists have formed
multidisciplinary committees to devise ethical principles for
the design, development, and use of artificial intelligence (AI)
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technologies [3]. Moreover, many governments and interna-
tional organizations have released sets of ethical principles,
including the OECD Principles in 2019 [4], the Montreal
Declaration in 2017 [5], the U.K. House of Lords report
“AI in the U.K.: ready willing and able?” in 2018 [6], the
European Commission High-Level Expert Group (HLEG) on
AI in 2018 [7], and the Beijing AI Principles in 2019 [8].
Indeed, recent reports indicate that there are currently more
than 70 publicly available sets of ethical principles or frame-
works for AI, most of which have been released within the
last five years [3], [9], [10].
The recent focus on ethical AI has arisen from increasing
concern over its unintended negative impacts, coupled with
a traditional exclusion of ethical analysis from engineering
practice. While engineers have always met basic ethical stan-
dards concerning safety, security, and functionality, issues to
do with justice, bias, addiction, and indirect societal harms
were traditionally considered out of scope. However, expecta-
tions are changing. While engineers are not, and we believe
should not, be expected to do the work of philosophers, psy-
chologists, and sociologists, they do need to work with experts
in these disciplines to anticipate and mitigate ethical risks as
a standard of practice. It is no longer acceptable for technology
to be released into the world blindly, leaving others to deal
with the consequences. Engineering educators have already
responded to this change in sentiment by evolving curricula to
help ensure the next generation of technology makers is better
equipped to engineer more responsibly [11], [12].
Yet, moving effectively from ethical theory and principles
into context specific, actionable practice is proving a signifi-
cant barrier for the widespread uptake of systematic ethical
impact analysis in software engineering [13], [14]. In this
article, we hope to contribute to resolving some of this
translational difficulty by presenting two frameworks (the
Responsible Design Process and the Spheres of Technology
Experience) together with the outcomes of an example ethical
analysis in the context of digital mental health. We hope that
both the frameworks and the case study will serve as resources
for those looking for guidance in translating ethical principles
into technology practice.
II. ETHICS IMPERATIVE IN HEALTH
AND INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS
Verbeek explains that “When technologies co-shape human
actions, they give material answers to the ethical question
of how to act” [15]. He also highlights how technologies
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inscribe the values of the designers, engineers, and businesses
who make them [16], [17]. As a result, responsibility must go
beyond the narrow definition of safety which, until recently,
has largely constituted professional norms for technologists.
Furthermore, ethical implications should be considered early
on and throughout the design, development, and implementa-
tion phases since value-laden tradeoffs are often made even
during the earliest stages of design. Achieving ethically desir-
able outcomes will neither be easy nor straightforward. For
instance, ethical design cannot be implemented as a sin-
gle, one-off, review process since technologies (especially,
intelligent ones) are continuously changing, as are the ways
users appropriate them, and the socio-technical contexts within
which they exist. Therefore, ethical impact evaluation must be
an ongoing, iterative process—one that involves various stake-
holders at every step, and can be re-evaluated over time, and
as new issues emerge.
While society-wide ethical considerations are a relatively
new focus within technology engineering [18] ethical enquiry
has a long history within healthcare, perhaps because health
practitioners work directly with the people they serve and
often within sensitive and high-risk contexts. Principles of
Biomedical Ethics [19] have been taught for 40 years. Hence,
those working on the engineering of health technologies will
need to adhere to both technology-related and biomedical
ethical principles.
Fortunately, at the level of basic principles, the AI com-
munities and biomedical ethicists might already be largely in
agreement. A recent analysis suggests that the plethora of
ethical AI frameworks can be consolidated into just five
meta-principles, four of which also constitute the principles
for biomedical ethics. These are: Respect for Autonomy,
Beneficence, Nonmaleficence, and Justice, with the addition
of “explicability” for AI [3].
Other recent systematic reviews of AI ethics principles
have produced somewhat different taxonomies (see [14], [20],
[21]). For example, Jobin et al. [9] reviewed 84 ethi-
cal guidelines and proposed 11 principles: 1) transparency;
2) justice and fairness; 3) nonmaleficence; 4) responsibility;
5) privacy; 6) beneficence; 7) freedom and autonomy; 8) trust;
9) dignity; 10) sustainability; and 11) solidarity. They found
a wide divergence in how these principles were interpreted
and in how the recommendations suggested they be applied.
They do, however, note some evidence of convergence (by
number of mentions) around five principles: 1) transparency;
2) justice and fairness; 3) nonmaleficence; 4) responsibility;
and 5) privacy.
Between this set of principles and the set we will be
using from the meta-analysis by Floridi et al. [3], there is
a significant overlap. We have found the latter set to be
particularly practical in the health domain, owing to its over-
lapping with biomedical ethics, however, we understand that
other principles are also important. However, broad princi-
ples fall short of dictating specific actions in practice. Indeed,
it has been acknowledged that these ethical frameworks do
not provide enough contextual guidance for engineers to
make use of them (e.g., [10], [14], and [22]). For exam-
ple, the principle of fairness could lead to affirmative action,
providing extra support for a group, or not, depending on
the context.
In order for abstract principles to translate into action-
able practice, the engineering discipline will need a vari-
ety of solutions. For example, the emerging development
of the IEEE’s PS7000 specifications stands to contribute
on this point. Additionally, work by Gebru et al. [13]
on “datasheets for datasets” in which they advocate for
clear documentation for datasets that records “motivation,
composition, collection process, recommended uses, and so
on” is one example of a suggestion that would opera-
tionalize more abstract principles, such as transparency and
accountability.
However, there will always be ethical decisions and trade-
offs that are not amenable to universally applicable spec-
ifications, and that need to be made with sensitivity to
specific context and stakeholders. In these cases, we will need
methods for conducting this kind of decision-making rigor-
ously. Responsible innovation requires these methods to be
anticipatory, reflexive, inclusive, and responsive [23].
The very fact that there has been some convergence around
a set of principles (rather than a single principle) seems to indi-
cate a kind of value pluralism—the view that there are multiple
values that are equally fundamental, and yet may sometimes
conflict with each other. How to navigate tradeoffs between
equally important values when conflicts arise is where con-
structive reflection and discourse may be most needed, and
where it will be important to acknowledge that cultural and
contextual differences may affect what the right outcome is
within practice (further discussions in [24] and [25]). Here,
methods for value-sensitive design (VSD) [16] can help devel-
opment teams and stakeholders articulate and align with
explicit values.
Moreover, data-enabled technologies employ a wide-range
of techniques that are used differently in different contexts, and
these diverse contexts raise unique concerns that will require
different ethical tradeoffs. It is unlikely that the same priorities
and solutions applicable to one domain, context, or project,
will translate across to others [22], [25], [26]. This means that
technology development teams will need to conduct bespoke
ethical evaluations for each project, in the same way, user
research and specifications analyses are unique to each project.
This need for ethical impact assessment for technology is akin
to the need for environmental impact assessment in other types
of engineering [27].
It is impossible to provide ethical principles that will be
specific enough to provide answers in practice, and yet broad
enough to apply universally. But it is possible to provide a pro-
cess. While every team and organization may devise their
own answers to ethical dilemmas, they should have system-
atic processes by which to do so consciously and rigorously,
leaving a record of these processes along with the values and
rationale they employed to make decisions. This record can
provide the public with transparency regarding the rationale
for a decision after the fact, as well as give the design team
confidence that such a decision was made in a systematic and
professional way. Such process will not guarantee a product
has no negative consequences, but it will help mitigate the
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Fig. 1. Connections among six fields centrally involved in the ethical design
and development of AI and data-enabled systems (based on Sloan founda-
tion’s hexagonal mapping of “connections among the cognitive sciences”
1978, reproduced in Gardner 1985, p. 37) key: unbroken lines = strong
interdisciplinary ties, broken lines = weak interdisciplinary ties.
risks, and provide professionals with the reassurance of having
acted responsibly.
In the next section, we present two frameworks that can
help provide structure for such a process for ethical impact
analysis.
III. MOVING FROM PRINCIPLES TO PRACTICE:
FRAMEWORKS FOR RESPONSIBLE TECHNOLOGY
DEVELOPMENT
A. Multidisciplinarity in AI Ethics
We begin our discussion of frameworks with a diagram-
matic representation of disciplines central to the development
of ethical AI and how they interconnect (see Fig. 1). The pri-
mary intention is to emphasize the importance of grounding
all ethical impact assessments in multidisciplinary expertise. It
is likely that new requirements in an increasingly AI-enhanced
world will lead to the development of new specializations
which blur traditional disciplinary boundaries. Nevertheless,
there is no single discipline capable of handling the task of
ethical analysis single-handedly. Given the complexity of the
problems, the best outcomes are likely to come from the
richest diversity.
For the digital health case study we present later, we
leveraged expertise from four different disciplines, includ-
ing design, engineering, human–computer interaction, and
philosophy. An ideal project would include even more dis-
ciplines, such as psychology and sociology (see Fig. 1), as
well as, end users, domain experts, and other stakehold-
ers. In the mental health context, for example, users may
include patients, therapists, and family, while domain experts
would include therapists, mental health researchers, and others
working within the healthcare system.
The importance of this multivocal approach cannot be
overstated as there can be a tendency for agile teams to con-
sist of just programmers, designers, and managers. Taking
digital mental health as a cautionary example, a failure to
involve psychologists, health practitioners, end users, and other
domain experts has led to an exploding industry of mental
health tools that lack evidence, inclusivity, and effectiveness
(and at worst, cause harm) [28]–[30]. This has been possible
because, while traditional channels for healthcare are highly
regulated, technology regulation lags behind and these tech-
nologies are unusually quick to implement and disseminate.
As Nebeker et al. [31] have cautioned: “it is critical that the
minimal requirements used to make a digital health technology
available to the public are not mistaken for a product that has
passed rigorous testing or demonstrated real-world therapeutic
value.”
B. Framework 1—The Responsible Design Process
Sometimes technology designers, like policymakers, are
forced to make values-based tradeoffs. For example, they
might be able to increase privacy at the expense of secu-
rity or increase accuracy at the expense of privacy. Moreover,
some technologies may increase the wellbeing of some at
the expense of others. Value-laden decisions arise as part of
engineering and can either be addressed in a cursory way by
one or a few individuals, or in a systematic and robust way
by teams. Only the latter approach can hold up to scrutiny
should negative consequences emerge after the fact. As such,
we need a technology development process that makes room
for this sort of robust decision making and for the ethical
impact analysis on which it must stand.
Innovators are often asked to address the consequences
of their technologies, but this post-hoc approach is increas-
ingly seen as limited. A number of nonregulatory approaches
have been developed to take into account the broader social
impact of new technologies including anticipatory governance,
technology assessment, and VSD [23].
They can all be included within “responsible innovation,”
a growing field of research exploring ways of “taking care of
the future through collective stewardship of science and inno-
vation in the present” [23]. As with many design practices, the
goal is to embed deliberation within the design and innovation
process.
An important aspect of responsible innovation is the con-
cept of human wellbeing, which is also at the center of many
current ethical frameworks. For example, the IEEE centers its
ethics specifications on human wellbeing. So too do several
government frameworks [4], [5].
As such, we argue that a responsible technology develop-
ment process will need to incorporate evidence-based methods
for evaluating the impact on, and designing for, human
wellbeing, by drawing on psychology (see [32], [33]).
However, the promotion of human wellbeing is not a com-
plete solution. After all, decisions must be made as to whose
wellbeing is being considered. When technology makers are
forced to make tradeoffs that increase the wellbeing of some
but at the expense of others, at the cost of long-term ecolog-
ical impacts, or in spite of other negative side effects, then
issues to do with justice, equality, and other values arise. This
is where ethical analysis, drawing on philosophy and other
disciplines, must come in.
As such, our conception of a responsible development pro-
cess involves taking existing design processes, particularly
those that are anticipatory, reflexive, inclusive, and responsive,
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Fig. 2. Responsible design process framework. A process for technology development in which wellbeing support and ethical impact analysis are incorporated
at each phase. A post-launch evaluation phase is also added.
and augmenting them with methods for ethical analysis and
wellbeing-supportive design. The approach described here
could include activities such as those used in VSD [16].
While development processes are as varied as technologists
themselves, there are a series of developmental phases that find
their way into most, if not all, approaches, and these include:
research, ideation, prototyping, and testing. The U.K. design
council consolidated these commonalities and created a pop-
ular “double diamond” diagram to illustrate them [34]. The
broadest and narrowest points of the diamonds represent points
of divergence and convergence. We began with this standard
process and integrated stages for wellbeing support and ethi-
cal decision making to create the resulting responsible design
process framework presented in Fig. 2.
Wellbeing in the diagram refers to human psychologi-
cal wellbeing and it is included separately to other ethical
issues because evidence-based design methods grounded in
psychological research already exist for it and allow it to
be attended to empirically. Analysis of other ethical dimen-
sions, such as fairness, data governance, ecosystem wellbeing,
or democratic participation cannot rely predominantly on
psychological research and will require different methods.
We describe each phase of the process in further detail
as follows.
Research: The research phase involves investigating the
needs, preferences, contexts, and lives of the people who
will be served or, otherwise, impacted by a technology. This
phase may include standard approaches to user research (e.g.,
design thinking methods, ethnographies, participatory work-
shops, etc.) as well as expert review and secondary research
in relation to the specific domain. Standard approaches can
surface wellbeing and ethical issues, however, tailoring these
methods to focus participants on ethical or psychological
reflection may be helpful.
Insights: This phase involves the analysis of the data from
the research phase, and synthesis into specific insights for
design. Data analysis can be done through the lens of well-
being theory with a view to anticipating harms and opportu-
nities for supporting healthy psychological experience. Ethics
data analysis can be done through the lens of an ethical frame-
work, and with a view to identifying potential biases, ethical
risks, and tensions.
Ideation: The ideation phase involves the divergent gen-
eration of ideas for design solutions. Ethical reflection can
be integrated into the ideation phase through framing. For
example, introducing wellbeing psychology concepts into the
ideation phase can help the team focus on root psychological
causes of user needs while introducing ethics concepts into
ideation can sensitize the team to ethical tensions that may
arise so that brainstorming can involve resolutions to these.
Prototypes: In this phase, the team converges on and builds
various design solutions. Responsible impact analysis involves
collaborative speculation on the wellbeing and ethical impacts
(good and bad) to which a particular design concept may
lead. This will ideally involve a wide range of stakeholders
including end users.
Evaluation (in Use): The real-life ethical impacts that
a technology will have on people, their communities and
the planet, can only be fully understood once the product
or service is in real-world use. Teams must speculate and
test in advance, but unintended use patterns are realities in
our complex socio-technical systems. Wellbeing impact eval-
uation involves evaluating the impact of technology use on
a user’s psychological experience during and after use. Ethical
impact evaluation involves evaluating the ethical impacts of
a technology’s use, not just on its users, but often, also on
those indirectly affected, such as their friends and families,
communities, society as a whole, and the planet.
In the framework described above, we have taken a famil-
iar process and incorporated phases for the integration of
ethics and wellbeing in an attempt to provide a map for
a more responsible development process. The map also pro-
vides a landscape within which to research, develop, and
situate new methods and tools to support each of these phases.
For example, research can be directed at identifying effective
methods for “ethical data analysis” within the insights phase,
“ethical framing” within ideation, and “ethical impact evalu-
ation” during use. Moreover, ethics-based methods and tools
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Fig. 3. Six spheres of technology experience (adapted from Peters,
Calvo, and Ryan [26]).
that already exist can be more easily integrated within the stan-
dard development process in this way. It is worth noting that,
while it is true an ideal project would start with responsible
methods from the beginning, we are aware that few projects
represent the ideal. Integrating wellbeing and ethics from any
point is likely better than not at all and will contribute to more
responsible outcomes.
C. Framework 2—The Spheres of Technology Experience
There has been a lack of appreciation for the different res-
olutions at which technologies can have an impact on the
experience. A technology can make an impact through the
design of its interface, based on the tasks it is designed to
support, through the behaviors it promotes, or as a collective
result of widespread societal use.
For instance, consider the way games impact wellbeing and
autonomy (autonomy is both a constituent of wellbeing [35]
and a central principle of AI ethics frameworks in its own
right). A user may experience a strong sense of autonomy and
wellbeing during game play, but because the game is designed
to increase compulsive engagement, a resulting addiction may
diminish the same user’s experience of autonomy at a life level
(as overuse crowds out time for taking care of work, family,
and other things of greater importance to her). Therefore, does
the game support or hinder autonomy? The answer in this
context is probably “both,” and therefore, a fair assessment of
ethical impact relies on an evaluation that takes into account
the impact at different resolutions.
Therefore, it is clear that greater precision is required
in order to effectively identify impacts at different granu-
larities within the technology experience. Calvo et al. [36]
first highlighted this need with respect to autonomy and
presented a framework distinguishing four “spheres of auton-
omy.” Peters et al. [32] expanded on this substantially, devel-
oping, as part of a larger model, a framework of technology
experience which identifies six distinct spheres within which
wellbeing can be influenced. It is this framework that we
believe can be usefully applied to provide a structure to ethical
impact analysis conducted during a responsible development
process. We provide an illustration of the six spheres in Fig. 3.
This “Spheres of Technology Experience” framework is
described in detail by Peters et al. [32] wherein they also
provided methods for wellbeing-supportive design. An appli-
cation of the framework to human autonomy in AI is described
in [37]. Below we provide just a brief description of each
sphere to show how each can also help to structure ethical
analysis.
Adoption: It refers to the experience of a technology prior to
use, including the marketing and socio-cultural forces leading
a person to use it. A development team may want to consider
the ethical impacts of the forces leading to uptake, and to
what extent users are choosing to use a product freely or being
coerced or pressured to do so. As a simple example, a new
upgrade can be forced upon existing users—an approach that is
notoriously un-user-friendly—or it can be introduced in a way
that better respects autonomy, as when developers provide an
option to “try the upgrade” first.
Interface: The interface sphere is the first sphere of the
“user experience” and involves interacting with the product
itself, including the use of navigation, buttons, and controls. At
this level, an ethical analysis might explore issues to do with
autonomy and inclusion, for example, to what extent does the
interface support autonomy by providing meaningful options
and controls? and, are users of different abilities or cultures
being excluded?
Task: Broadening the lens of analysis beyond the interface,
the task sphere refers to discrete activities enabled, or
enhanced, by the technology. For example, in the case of a fit-
ness app, “tracking steps” or “adding a meal to the diary”
constitute tasks. Ethical impacts arising from an analysis of
these tasks might include the risk of inadvertently contribut-
ing to eating disorders or anxiety. Awareness of these risks
can help designers structure tasks in ways that respect the
diverse needs of users and provide safeguards against negative
outcomes.
Behavior: Combinations of tasks contribute to an overall
behavior. For example, the task “step-counting” might con-
tribute to the overall behavior: “exercise.” For technologies
intending to positively impact on a particular behavior, it is
important to consider the psychology literature on the effects
of various approaches to supporting that behavior (and/or work
with a psychologist).
Life: The final and broadest sphere within the user’s expe-
rience is life, which captures the impacts of a technology at
a life level. Not all technologies will have impacts significant
enough to yield measurable effects on a person’s quality of
life overall. While a self-driving car may impact measures of
autonomy and wellbeing at the life sphere for someone who
is vision impaired, the extent to which a cooking timer is cus-
tomizable probably will not. While many technologies have
only narrow application, and there is little reason to expect
them to impact the life sphere, others, such as those that target
wellbeing directly (i.e., meditation and fitness apps) or those
used daily (workplace technologies, entertainment products,
and social media) do need to consider and anticipate life-level
impacts.
Society: Expanding beyond the user experience into the
broadest sphere, society involves the direct and collateral
impact on nonusers, nonhuman life, and the environment. The
self-driving car mentioned above may promote wellbeing for
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some users but decrease it for those whose livelihoods depend
on driving. This can only be revealed at a societal level of
analysis which entails the exploration of emergent and com-
plex systems. This sphere presents the greatest challenges to
impact analysis. Identifying and anticipating ethical impacts
at this level will not only require multidisciplinary expertise
but also ongoing evaluation after a technology is released
into use. Nevertheless, some specific methods already exist to
assist developers in anticipating societal impact. “Consequence
scanning” is a method developed by the nonprofit organiza-
tion, Doteveryone, dedicated to responsible innovation [38].
The method provides a step-by-step process for collaboratively
identifying ethical risks and tensions associated with a new or
planned product or service.
It is important to qualify that the boundaries between the
six spheres of technology experience are merely conceptual
and should not be seen as concrete. Instead, they are intended
to provide a way of organizing thinking and evaluation that
allows for the identification of contradictory parallel effects.
The ways in which the Spheres of Technology Experience
framework allows us to identify and target wellbeing and eth-
ical impact helps to ensure analysis is both more thoroughly
and clearly articulated. The fact that empirical measures
already exist that can be applied to these spheres also makes
their application practical and actionable. Existing measures
(described in [32]) can help developers to quantitatively com-
pare different technologies and designs with regard to their
different impacts on a range of ethical and wellbeing-related
attributes and within different spheres. Some examples of how
measures have been used to evaluate the ethical impact already
exist. For example, Kerner and Goodyear [39] conducted
a study investigating the psychological impact of wearable fit-
ness trackers. Additionally, a series of studies comparing how
different game designs impact wellbeing and autonomy have
been conducted using psychological measures [40], [41].
While the above examples focus on autonomy and wellbe-
ing, the spheres can be used to articulate impact in relation
to any ethical values, and at any stage within the responsible
development process.
IV. CASE STUDY—RESPONSIBLE DIGITAL
MENTAL HEALTH TECHNOLOGIES
A. Project Background
During the process of identifying methods for responsible
design practice, we were commissioned by a health technol-
ogy company to explore the ethical tensions arising in the
health domain and recommendations for how these could be
addressed. The company wanted to follow more responsible
practices, and sought to anticipate unintended consequences.
We viewed this an opportunity to enrich our experience
with ethical analysis and to apply the frameworks described
above.
The product in question was a text-based online therapy pro-
gram for depression and anxiety. As part of the research phase
(see Fig. 2) of our responsible design framework, the expert
review we provided was later combined with commercial user
research data to help create insights and inform ideation.
We believe an expert-led analysis within the research phase
is a valuable way to: 1) involve disciplinary experts; 2) draw
on existing knowledge; 3) sensitize the development team to
ethical issues early on; 4) inform the design of user studies;
and 5) assist the interpretation of user data.
The analysis below is the outcome of a multidisciplinary
literature review and analysis involving a team of researchers
with significant professional experience in the co-design and
development of digital health technologies. Specifically, and
consistent with the claim that ethical impact analysis must be
a multidisciplinary endeavor, the team consisted of combined
expertise in engineering, design, human–computer interaction,
psychology, and philosophy. It also employed the Spheres of
Technology Experience framework described above to guide
the identification of key ethical considerations within digital
mental health.
The outcomes pertain to a narrow genre of technologies,
rather than a specific product, but the same approach could be
taken for a product-specific context.
The analysis is structured according to the five ethical
principles described in Section II. As such, recommenda-
tions are grouped into these five categories: 1) Respect for
autonomy (Section IV-C); 2) Beneficence (Section IV-D);
3) Nonmaleficence (Section IV-E); 4) Justice (Section IV-F);
and 5) Explicability (Section IV-G). While there are many sets
of principles, we chose these five for this analysis because they
align with the principles of medical ethics.
The analysis is presented in the form of a series of rec-
ommendations intended for design and development teams of
mental health technologies. Each is presented with: elaboration
that connects it to real-world context; a brief overview of how
it is addressed in practical ethics; how it may be considered
in the context of the application; and specific practical strate-
gies for development which draw on design and engineering
literature.
B. Online Therapy Within Digital Mental Health
Depression is the leading cause of disability worldwide [42]
making data-enabled mental health technologies a critical
area of research and industry. These technologies have the
potential to increase access to therapy, reduce disparities,
reduce costs, and improve the effectiveness of mental health
care. But rapid change, coupled with the rapid introduction of
new technologies into such a sensitive area, has brought new
ethical challenges involving transparency, patient involvement,
and human autonomy.
A number of authors within human–computer
interaction have articulated some of the ethically
loaded socio-technical challenges facing digital men-
tal health developers [28]–[31], [43], [44]. For example,
Orlowski et al. [44] stated: “Design solutions not generated
with end users themselves are more likely to fail... Moreover,
from an ethical and moral perspective, egalitarian ways of
working, such as those exemplified by participatory design,
represent a promising opportunity to redress the legacy of
consumer disempowerment in mental health.”
Another important criticism of traditional practice in digital
mental health revolves around respect for autonomy, a core
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ethical principle. As Mohr et al. [45] explained: “essentially,
clinical researchers have designed tools to try to get people to
do what we want them to do and how we want them to do it.”
The literature has also highlighted the ethical issue of trans-
parency as critical to this area. For example, the Psyberguide,
developed by a nonprofit network of mental health profession-
als, includes transparency as one of three criteria for quality
ratings of mental health technologies (the other two being
credibility and user experience) [46].
The specific analysis herein focuses on online text-based one-
to-one professional therapy for depression and anxiety. This
is an augmentative approach to online therapy which, rather
than replacing humans, aims to use data to increase human
capabilities and to make human activity and interaction more
effective, efficient, and satisfying. The analysis is presented
as a series of recommendations followed by philosophical
justification and practical strategies for implementation.
C. Respect for Autonomy
Recommendation 1: Mental health technologies should be
designed to protect and support user autonomy. In medical
ethics, the principle of autonomy includes respect for both an
individual’s right to decide and for the freedom of whether to
decide [19]. Together, these are meant to protect both our right
to make choices and our freedom to choose how and when
we want to exercise that right [47]. Respect for autonomy is
essential for the development of any digital health technology,
but in the case of mental health technologies, it is particularly
challenging. This is because certain mental illnesses can affect
one’s capacity to reason, one’s perception of oneself and of
others, one’s ability to make decisions, and other cognitive
capacities that are core to one’s ability to self-govern.
Burr and Morley [47] discussed how the presence of a men-
tal illness might also affect a patient’s choice to engage with
a mental health service and restrict their ability to make
healthcare decisions. In extreme cases, respecting a patient’s
autonomy (i.e., nonintervention) may even threaten safety, if
there is a risk of harm to self or others. What this suggests
is that: 1) respect for patient autonomy is defeasible such that
it may sometimes have to be traded off against other goods
and 2) in some cases healthcare providers may need to go
beyond respect for a patient’s current ability to self-govern to
help build and support the user’s autonomy in the long term.
Online professional text-based therapies will involve (at
least) two kinds of users: 1) patients and 2) therapists (coun-
selors). It is important to also think of the therapist as a user of
this technology, as their role will be changed and augmented
by these new tools. This is also true for other kinds of data-
enabled medical technologies which will affect not only the
patient but also healthcare professionals.
Recommendation 2: To protect the privacy and auton-
omy of users, make transparent the use of mental health
data and ensure secure storage. Online mental health ther-
apy applications that collect, store, and make use of personal
data raise several important concerns around privacy, which
in turn can pose risks to user autonomy [48], [49]. In par-
ticular, because of the kind of personal data that is now
available to be collected (e.g., biometrics, location, and online
behavior) combined with advances in machine learning that
make it possible to infer personal attributes from collected
data (e.g., [50] and [51]) companies are increasingly able to
tailor messages and services to specific individuals or groups.
This means that the more personal information a company has
about someone, the more effectively they can target interven-
tions in an attempt to influence them which may present new
risks to patient autonomy.
Even features that can serve as a means of patient empow-
erment, such as self-tracking, which can be used to boost
self-reflection, can pose risks to autonomy. But the sharing
or use of this data, be it with family, friends, or even health-
care professionals—especially in nonemergency situations—
can negatively affect patient autonomy. Sanches et al. [43]
described this as an example of “autonomy [of patients being]
claimed by their social support network, collectivized by
healthcare services, or both.” This explains why designing for
privacy as a target can also be considered a subset of autonomy
support [52].
Furthermore, since therapy sessions involve two interlocu-
tors, both sides have reasonable claims to privacy. It is
important that all users are given clear and accurate expla-
nations about how the information collected from therapy
sessions is being used. This is especially true since users,
including counselors, may not be aware of the value of their
data. One way of using the data, for example, is for analyzing
the counselors’ conversations. This may be problematic, but
also presents an opportunity to provide feedback if handled in
a manner that does not feel intrusive.
1) Practical Strategies for Respecting Autonomy: The liter-
ature on self-determination theory, a robustly evidence-based
psychological theory of wellbeing and motivation [35] pro-
vides guidance with respect to what characteristics constitute
“autonomy-supportive” (versus controlling) environments and
interactions. According to this article, autonomy-supportive
interactions as follows.
1) Understand the other’s perspective (frame of reference).
2) Seek the other’s input and ideas.
3) Offer meaningful choices.
4) Empathize with resistance and obstacles.
5) Minimize the use of controlling language or rewards.
6) Provide a rationale for requested or required
behavior.
These can be translated into design guidance for digital tech-
nologies. For example, applying empathy is the cornerstone of
human-centered design so employing human-centered methods
is likely to increase autonomy-supportive outcomes. Seeking
the user’s input and ideas is also achieved through human-
centered and participatory processes. In the mental health
context, this requires engagement with people with have suf-
fered mental illness as only they have direct expertise around
frames of reference, threats to autonomy and privacy within
their contexts, and insights into the kinds of obstacles that are
most salient for them. Moreover, insights from these processes
can inform what meaningful choices can be added to the tech-
nology. With respect to the protection of privacy specifically
(recommendation 2), meaningful choices are likely to involve
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giving the client control over when and with whom data is
shared.
Security experts should be consulted in ensuring that the
data collected and analyzed in the course of mental health
therapy is safely and securely stored, and that it is only
shared through properly encrypted channels. In many coun-
tries, this is required by the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) and similar legislation.
D. Beneficence
Recommendation 3: Consider the wider impact of both
opportunities and risks for all stakeholders involved in the
development and use of mental health technologies. In
biomedical ethics, the principle of beneficence is typically
thought of as a commitment to “do good.” In this context, this
will require that the potential benefits of a design or develop-
ment choice be balanced against potential risks, both for an
individual user and for society more broadly [19].
First, it is important to identify all those who stand to benefit
from a particular technology. In addition to patients, the use
of online text-based therapies impacts therapists, developers,
family members, other patients, and the wider mental health
care community. Hence, there is a need to adopt a holistic
approach to design and implementation that ensures that all
parties affected are considered.
Moreover, the collateral impact might involve other, less
obvious, stakeholders, such as developers themselves. For
example, with supervised learning, a human has to assign
labels to data used to train predictive algorithms. In the case of
mental health therapies, this means that an employee must read
and tag sensitive conversations between doctors and patients.
This could have a harmful psychological impact on developers
since therapy sessions are likely to contain content that could
be distressing or triggering, depending on one’s own life expe-
riences. Such a labeling task might require training, so that the
developer has the necessary context for what they might read
as well as training on how to cope.
Relatedly, Sanches et al. [43] expressed worry about
“burnout” for HCI researchers working in the challenging
area of mental health and mention the need for greater peer and
institutional support. They also suggest rethinking how such
support can be explicitly factored into institutional guidelines
and budgets.
Recommendation 4: Research the access requirements and
unique mental health situations of diverse populations in order
to ensure mental health technologies are effective for all rel-
evant groups. In many cases, the risks of a new technology
are not evenly distributed. In the context of data-enabled digi-
tal mental health therapies, the relative dearth of research and
understanding on the needs of people from diverse socioeco-
nomic and ethnic groups may put members of those groups at
greater risk.
If online therapies are developed using a data set that only
includes relatively affluent university students, or that lacks
other forms of representation, then the therapy will only be
optimized for a homogeneous group. Hence, it is important
that the training set for the algorithm genuinely represents the
diversity of the target population that will use it.
In practice what this means is that in some cases sets used
to evaluate algorithms might need to come from a different
statistical distribution than the training set. This comes with
its own challenges, for example, understanding the wide vari-
ation in groups affected by mental illness, reaching out to
“hard to reach populations” (e.g., the homeless, refugees, those
addicted to drugs, etc.) and how measures can be used to yield
inclusive and broadly beneficial interventions.
Recommendation 5: Aim to support authentic human inter-
actions, connectivity, and engagement. Another example of
the kind of balancing that needs to be done to ensure benef-
icence, involves the opportunities and risks that digital health
technologies pose for authentic relationships. The context
of mental healthcare requires respect, dignity, and empathy.
However, even highly sophisticated AI systems lack human
empathy and are at best able to mimic these traits. Thus, even
partial automation in mental healthcare, if not implemented
cautiously, could threaten “relational authenticity” [53].
In Hertlein et al.’s [54] study of family and marriage coun-
selors’ ethical concerns around online therapy, one theme
that emerged was the impact to the therapeutic relation-
ship. One participant expressed concern that there may be
“missed information, lost feelings/understanding, lack of inti-
macy and disclosure.” Another therapist worried that online
therapy “lacks the opportunity for physical human interaction,
such as offering a crying client a tissue or engaging in thera-
peutic touch, which could possibly act as a barrier to joining
effectively with clients.” These statements capture the con-
cerns that the use of AI could lead to feelings of alienation
and devaluation.
A related concern is a reduction in the quality of com-
munication that may result from the lack of nonverbal cues
and body language. This is true for online therapy, but also
more broadly for other forms of data-enabled digital health
interventions. There is some evidence, for example, that the
data entry required for electronic medical records (EMRs) dis-
rupts the nonverbal relationship between health-care providers
and patients (e.g., [55]). Other research has shown that non-
verbal cues, including eye contact and social touch (e.g.,
handshakes), have been found to significantly influence patient
perceptions of clinician empathy [56]. Hence, the loss of
such nonverbal cues can make it more difficult for health
care providers to demonstrate empathy and to build authentic
relationships with clients.
In addition to concerns about alienation and reduced qual-
ity of communication, some evidence suggests that rela-
tional authenticity also encourages patient engagement and
trust [57]. Hence, any reduction in relational autonomy might,
in turn, diminish engagement and trust. In their recent
report, Sanches et al. [43] expressed a desire to see “more
novel designs of systems that foster and support benefi-
cial human interactions, beyond the design of autonomous
agents imitating empathy and aimed at replacing human
contact.”
On the other hand, technological interventions in mental
health may provide new opportunities for engagement that are
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not available in a strictly human-to-human context. For exam-
ple, a 3-D avatar that functions like a virtual therapist but was
not trying to perfectly emulate a human being [58]. The result
was (somewhat surprisingly) positive: “Patients admit that they
feel less judged by the virtual therapist and more open to her,
especially, if they were told that she was operated automati-
cally rather than by a remote person” [59]. This suggests that
patients might be able to have differently authentic interac-
tions with technologically mediated systems, if they are well
designed. Designs such as these may be able to explore new
ways of connecting with humans and eliciting beneficial rela-
tionships and experiences that are authentic in their own way,
though not authentically human.
1) Practical Strategies for Beneficence: Arguably, the tech-
nology experience of people living with mental health issues
can only be well understood by engaging directly with them
as part of a collaborative design and evaluation process. This
experience will be shaped by socio-economic and cultural cir-
cumstances and will, therefore, differ among individuals, yet
meaningful patterns will still exist. User involvement that ade-
quately represents the diversity of potential users of a service
is therefore critical to bringing about genuine benefit. This
inclusive process will also help to prevent blindness to the
reality of the wide spectrum of audience needs within mental
health service provision. This includes differing requirements
due to low income, disability, low literacy, limited access to
computers, mobile phones, and Internet connections, as well
as low technology literacy (even among young people) [60].
In addition, users will prefer different modes of technol-
ogy use at different times. For example, an insomnia therapy
that does not require keeping a phone by the bed may be far
more effective, while users may not feel comfortable using
an audio or video-based program within public spaces. As
such, designers should consider providing clients with multiple
ways of accessing materials and consider how flexibility can
be provided in the delivery of services.
E. Nonmaleficence
Within medical ethics, nonmaleficence is an obligation not
to cause harm. This also applies to the design and development
of data-enabled digital mental health therapies. The difficulty
with this principle is avoiding the “known unknowns”—that
is, harms that one foresees, though with some uncertainty—as
well as the “unknown unknowns”—that is, harms that one does
not foresee. The latter requires evaluating (and re-evaluating)
impact both during development and after release.
Recommendation 6: While augmentation can be beneficial,
ensure that over-reliance on technology does not lead to atro-
phy of critical skills or diminish competence. One example
of a foreseeable, though uncertain, the harm is atrophy. Skill
atrophy is the decline in abilities that comes from underuse or
neglect to perform the behaviors and tasks that keep skills
up to date. Over-reliance on technology has been cited as
a contributor to atrophy of skills in many different contexts
(e.g., [61] and [62])—a concern that dates back at least as far
as Plato’s discussion of the diminishing effects that writing
would have on memory [63]. As more tasks are automated in
the context of mental health, this could result in atrophy of
previously used skills of both patients and therapists.
Though there is a case to be made for the replacement
of particular types of skills or activities for more worthwhile
use of human capacities (e.g., replacing repetitive calculations
or data entry with creative or empathic pursuits), there are
also risks to be managed, as atrophy can lead to dependence
and even safety issues. These risks can necessitate the need
to create fail-safes (procedures for cases in which technol-
ogy malfunctions and people need to rely on past skills), or
they might necessitate not introducing technology into realms
where humans should remain critically vigilant or engaged,
such as areas that require value judgments [64]. Some areas
of mental health-care may be among these.
For patients, there may be a risk of losing good decision-
making skills and the ability to check-in with themselves, to
self-reflect, as well as to understand and troubleshoot symp-
toms and emotions. Technology can be a tool to prompt
analysis of mood or symptom data, provide encouragement or
trigger an alert for when to get help. But if someone is entirely
dependent on a device for self-reflection they may lose com-
petence at self-management when they are decoupled from
the device (e.g., due to a loss of network connection, a dam-
aged device, or no battery power). Additionally, dependence
on a technology to manage care may result in lower feelings
of self-efficacy, empowerment, and control [64].
For therapists, the introduction of technology into the diag-
nostic and therapeutic process could result in atrophy of
critical professional skills. In cognitive-behavioral therapy
sessions, therapists interact closely with patients through struc-
tured discussion sessions to break down problems into separate
parts (thoughts, behaviors, and actions) and then to suggest
strategies that patients can use to change their thinking and
behavior. The success of these sessions depends on the thera-
pist’s ability to home in on problems, deconstruct them, engage
patients, and suggest strategies to adopt. All of these steps
are skills that therapists develop over time, and they are also
all skills that can be augmented through AI and digital tech-
nologies. This, in turn, makes them susceptible to atrophy. If
a therapist becomes over-reliant on an app that aids in these
skills, over time she may lose them and struggle to be as
effective in face-to-face sessions with patients.
Technologists will need to work closely with therapists and
patients to determine appropriate areas for automation and
augmentation and then evaluate outcomes after release.
Recommendation 7: To avoid risks arising from stigma,
design to protect the privacy of users and always ensure secure
storage of mental health data. Another foreseeable though
uncertain harm is privacy. Because mental health is a stigma-
tized topic, those that suffer from mental health conditions face
the risk of bias and discrimination, from both themselves (self-
stigma) and others. This means that if digital health records of
mental health status are leaked, hacked, or accessed by uncon-
sented third parties, a user’s dignity and reputation could be
threatened, and they could be put at risk of discrimination.
These concerns are true in traditional (face-to-face) therapy
as well, but relying on digital online platforms, from EMRs,
to online therapies, poses new risks to both informational and
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decisional privacy [65]. In Hertlein et al.’s [54] survey, par-
ticipants expressed concerns about the authenticity of the user
(such as “who has access to the computer” and “the [chance] of
loss of control of who has the device at the other end”), about
who else might be physically present in the same room as the
counselor (“How can the therapist or client be sure no one else
is in the vicinity of the computer-that is, how can you assure
confidentiality?”), and about the possibility of hackers (“secu-
rity online is not guaranteed.”) Hence, in the case of online
therapy, patients not only have to trust their counselor’s good
intentions, they also have to trust that counselors will protect
their computer screen or other devices from onlookers, pro-
tect their passwords, use secure network connections, and not
use shared computers [54], [66]. Patients furthermore have to
trust the provider of the technology not to use the data for any
unconsented purpose.
For this reason, it is important that the utmost care is taken
by companies to protect and anonymize the use and storage of
sensitive data. Doherty et al. [52] suggested additional design
implications to protect against the risks of stigma.
1) Practical Strategies for Nonmaleficence: There are
a number of practical strategies that help ensure the principle
of “do no harm” is followed. First, in addition to user research
and involvement, a safe user experience design depends upon
iterative improvement based on the ongoing evaluation. Health
technologies also require clinically relevant efficacy trials.
Owing to the potentially drastic consequences of ineffective
(i.e., potentially harmful) mental health technology, evaluation
of both user experience and health outcomes is an essential
criterion for a responsible approach.
Evaluation might initially consist of expert review, heuristic
evaluations, and internal prototype testing, and be followed by
pilot studies evaluating technologies with users until there is
sufficient evidence of feasibility and benefit to justify a more
formal clinical evaluation. Further evaluation after the release
of the product can inform improvements and upgrades and
is necessary for determining impact and appropriation within
complex real-world contexts (which are often very different
to the controlled environments of clinical trials). Our frame-
work for a responsible design process calls for just this kind
of staged approach to evaluation (see Doherty et al. [52] for
further discussion of a staged approach to the evaluation of
mental health technologies more specifically).
Moreover, as alluded to earlier, when it comes to mental
health technologies, technologists should not attempt to “go
it alone.” Ensuring that users, their contexts, the healthcare
system, medical research, safety, ethical implications, and
many other critical considerations are given expert attention
requires a multidisciplinary team. Traditional approaches
to “failing fast and often” are potentially disastrous in
a health context in which people cannot always safely be
used as guinea pigs for a/b testing. As such, mental health
professionals must be part of the design and development
team. They can help ensure more rigorous, evidence-
based, and appropriately safety-conscious approaches
are taken.
Experts in ethics should also contribute in order to effec-
tively assess ethical considerations from multiple standpoints.
It may be helpful for them to work directly with user experi-
ence specialists to allow broad stakeholder input into ethical
concerns.
In addition to involving multidisciplinary teams and under-
taking ongoing evaluation, technology approaches need to be
grounded in research to prevent harm. Topham et al. [67]
argued that it is an ethical responsibility “to ensure that mental
health technologies are grounded in solid and valid principles
to maximize the benefits and limit harm.” Doherty et al. [52]
similarly recommended that systems be based on accepted
theoretical approaches for clinical validity.
Furthermore, a need for rigorous approaches should apply,
not only to the therapeutic program employed but also to
the user research and evaluation practices. A human-centered
focus on lived experience suggests the importance of mixed
methods including qualitative methods for uncovering insights
into subjective experience, motivation, and the causes of
engagement and disengagement. These can complement and
explain results from quantitative approaches, such as symptom
scores, behavioral analytics, or surveys.
Finally, a simple safeguard for avoiding nonmaleficence is
to apply existing quality frameworks. A number of quality
frameworks and guidelines have been developed by multidis-
ciplinary groups of researchers and these can be applied as
a basic foundation for more responsible design. For example,
the transparency for trust principles [68] includes questions
around privacy and data security, development characteris-
tics, feasibility, and health benefits, and their creators advocate
that all apps should be required to provide information relat-
ing to these four principles at minimum. More specific to
mental health, the Psyberguide, developed by mental health
professionals, bases its ratings on criteria for credibility,
user experience, and transparency [46] while the American
Psychiatric Association has an app evaluation model for
psychiatrists [69]. Technology-specific guidelines have also
been developed, including the guidelines for the design of
interventions for mental health on social media [70].
With respect to ensuring anonymity to prevent harms from
stigma (recommendation 7), design implications may involve
allowing for discreet use. For example, studies have revealed
problems with app titles that include stigmatized words like
“mood” or “mental health” because users worry others will
see them [52]. The discreet design may also involve avoiding
client-identifying data on the interface whenever possible (e.g.,
data graph screens that do not need to include personal details).
F. Justice
Justice is a complex ethical principle that is closely linked
to fairness and equality, though is not quite the same as
either [71]. Sanches et al. [43] described the principle as
requiring the “fair distribution of benefits, risks, and costs to
all people irrespectively of social class, race, gender, or other
forms of discrimination.” In medical ethics, the principle is
often subdivided into three categories: 1) distributive justice;
2) rights-based justice; and 3) legal justice. Distributive justice
requires the fair distribution of resources and is particularly
concerned with scarce resources. Rights-based justice requires
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that people’s basic human rights be respected [72]. Privacy and
autonomy, for example, are widely recognized as human rights
and hence some of the concerns raised thus far would fall
under rights-based justice. Finally, legal justice requires that
people’s legal rights be respected. The development and imple-
mentation of data-enabled digital mental health technologies
raises particular concerns about distributive and rights-based
forms of justice. Because the law differs by jurisdiction, we
will not discuss legal justice.
There are two main areas in which to analyze distribu-
tive and rights-based justice within data-enabled mental health
technologies: 1) in the design process and 2) in the distribution
of the final product or service. In the first, compensation and
credit for the human labor involved in algorithmic design must
be considered; and in the second, questions about who is able
to access and make use of the service need to be considered.
Recommendation 8: Make known the value of human labor
and intellectual property in the development of algorithms to
all parties, and potentially compensate for it. With regard to
the design process, one type of ethical challenge arises from
“heteromation”: the extraction of economic value from low-
cost (or free) labor [73]. This includes all sorts of labor, from
Amazon Mechanical Turk workers, who are paid very low
wages to complete tasks that are difficult for an algorithm
to do, to the work of completing a Captcha, or other forms
of reverse Turing tests, where a person must prove they are
human by completing a task (e.g., identifying and selecting
all images of crosswalks in a series of nine photographs).
These tasks automatically build training sets for algorithms
that will eventually be able to accomplish these tasks them-
selves. Hence, there may be a transfer of intellectual property
to the company for which the human laborers are not cred-
ited, as well as work for which they may not be adequately
compensated. These issues can be addressed in some projects
by disclosing the uses of data or seeking approval to use the
data for research and development purposes. This has been
done, for example, in EQClinic, a project in which a tele-
health platform is used to help medical students improve their
communication skills [74].
A related concern in the development and prototyping of
products is piloting on low income, high need, or otherwise
vulnerable populations. On the one hand, providing a service
to a population that has a critical need for it and may be
willing to try an earlier developed prototype seems sensible.
On the other hand, it may involve putting these vulnera-
ble populations at risk by deploying or testing unfinished
solutions.
One area to potentially draw upon in considering these
issues is the cost-benefit considerations at play in the treat-
ment of rare diseases for which there are no known and tested
cures [75]. When it comes to new or experimental medical
technologies there is an absolute need to obtain informed
consent, so that when patients agree to testing they do so
with full understanding of the potential benefits and harms.
It is important to make sure that any vulnerable population
is informed about other options for care, so that they may
reasonably decline new (especially, experimental) treatments
without feeling compelled to accept them.
There may, of course, also be positive social justice out-
comes that encourage early users to act as “data altruists.” For
example, early advances in algorithmic solutions can reduce
costs for future generations and expand access to less advan-
taged segments of the population. There is evidence that
some people may be willing to share their data, even with-
out direct compensation, if these benefits are communicated
to them [76], [77].
Recommendation 9: Follow guidelines for universal accessi-
bility and tailor the level and mode of content to the spectrum
of audience needs. Certainly, one positive feature of online
therapies is that they can increase access for remote and
working populations. In these ways, online therapy, reduces
the barrier to entry and could increase uptake. It is unfair,
however, to assume that low-income populations all have
access to the necessary computing devices and stable Internet
connections. Burr and Morley [47] have recently argued that
genuine empowerment of a patient crucially depends on
“the prior removal of certain barriers to engagement, which
patients suffering from a variety of mental health conditions
face.”
As national healthcare services move increasingly toward
online therapies, research must be done on which popula-
tions are equipped for uptake, so that vulnerable communities
are not left out. Beyond initial uptake, there is further evi-
dence that minority populations tend to have lower retention
in mental healthcare [78]. Thus, there is a critical need for
more research into the root causes of this finding, as well
as ways to better tailor to these populations with the use of
online therapies. This includes designing for differing require-
ments relating to income, literacy levels, and technology
access [60].
1) Practical Strategies for Supporting Justice: International
guidelines for digital accessibility and “universal design” pro-
vide essential starting points for ensuring a technology does
not exclude users with older devices, limited Internet access,
physical disabilities, or other varying requirements.
Furthermore, as mentioned, researchers have expressed
a need for more involvement of people living with men-
tal health issues in technology design [43]–[45]. Deep user
involvement is not only necessary in order for a technology
to be genuinely useful and engaging to its audience, but is
also arguably, a matter of design justice, in that it represents
a more democratic and consultative approach.
One popular approach to user involvement is “participatory
design” [79] which involves including users as collabora-
tors from the earliest exploratory phases of development.
Orlowski et al. [44] provided specific examples of practical
applications of participatory design and design thinking meth-
ods for mental health technology. Likewise, where the use of
a technology will require the involvement of carers, parents,
or providers, their unique needs should also be included.
Finally, it is worth noting that the term “user” itself,
while useful for its specificity within the technology con-
text, can be inadvertently de-humanizing, obscuring ethical
responsibilities. Therefore, in many cases, words like “human,”
“clients,” “patients,” “people,” or even “lives” may be far more
appropriate.
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G. Explicability
In addition to the four traditional bioethical principles,
Floridi et al. [3] included explicability for the AI context,
which they describe as enabling the other principles through
both intelligibility and accountability. Other terms, such as
“transparency,” are also frequently used in AI ethics frame-
works to capture a similar duty [e.g., the IEEE (2019) [2]
uses both transparency and “accountability”]. In general, the
idea is that we (i.e., designers, users, and society more gen-
erally) need to be able to understand data-enabled systems
enough to somehow hold to account their functions (both in
terms of their input data and their outputs). We will focus our
discussion on the concepts of transparency and accountability
as aligned with the IEEE guidelines [2].
Recommendation 10: Ensure transparency and accountabil-
ity in all aspects of the use of mental health technologies as
it is critical to safe and beneficial care. Transparency to do
with the collection, use, and storage of data is fundamental to
ensuring privacy and other rights, such as informed consent.
There are many areas in which transparency must be integrated
within an online text-based mental health platform, and many
of these arise from the use of a mediating platform which
introduces other parties into what was traditionally a confiden-
tial conversation between counselor and patient. For example,
developers need to be involved in order to design and support
the platform; conversations may be recorded and analyzed for
potential introduction of AI capabilities; and then these capa-
bilities will need to be audited in order to ensure they function
correctly. All of these new layers will require some degree of
transparency and accountability.
When signing up for a platform and consenting to therapy
conducted in online formats, patients should have an under-
standing of who will have access to what parts of their data and
why. As more data is collected and recorded, it should be made
clear which parties have access to patient notes and therapist-
patient conversational records. Additionally, text-based therapy
introduces the possibility for different interactions with the
data from a session, but this access comes with both benefits
and risks which need to be carefully considered [80].
At a high level, there should also be basic transparency
and accountability around business models since for-profit
advertising or payments from insurance providers or employer
health programs may come with incentives that conflict with
the best interests of patients. Funding sources and revenue
models may create conflicts of interest in data sharing and
breach the trust of patients.
1) Practical Strategies for Explicability: Quality frame-
works for digital health provide a valuable starting point
for applying principles of transparency and accountability.
For example, The Transparency for Trust Principles [68]
require standard information to be communicated to users
in understandable ways, including information around pri-
vacy, data security, development characteristics, feasibility, and
health benefits. The Psyberguide [46] bases ratings on trans-
parency as well, so examples of technologies that meet the
transparency criteria provide models for practical approaches
to implementation.
V. CONCLUSION
The recommendations described above present the result of
an ethical analysis conducted by a particular team of profes-
sionals in the context of a particular technology type within
a specific domain. Analyses by other teams would yield dif-
ferent outcomes although it is reasonable to assume that, for
a given context, patterns of concerns will emerge that overlap.
As digital ethics continues to grow in importance, the
ethical principles for AI can help us to structure ethical
impact analyses. However, the translation of ethical princi-
ples into actionable strategies in practice is challenging. We
have presented a number of frameworks, including one for
a responsible design process and another for providing greater
resolution to technology experience as a contribution toward
helping address the difficulty in moving from principle to
practice within ethical impact analysis.
We have also provided a description of the outcomes of an
expert-led ethical analysis, conducted in the context of digital
health, in order to show one way such an analysis might be
contribute to early stages in a development process.
Of course, our contribution goes only a very small way
toward the full integration of ethical impact assessment needed
within engineering practice. More research and experimen-
tation with various tools and methods, as well as focused
research on ethical implications pertinent to specific applica-
tion areas and technologies, is still very much needed. We
hope the frameworks presented can provide some help toward
shaping that path.
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